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1I. Introduction
The present paper is about research heuristics and methods within the field of
economic organization.  Its basic message is that the theory of economic
organization can benefit from what is here referred to as “market process
theory”, particularly in its Austrian manifestation.   Fundamentally, this is
because the modern economics of organization (principal-agent, incomplete
contracts, transaction cost economics) confronts a number of both basic and
crucial issues related to firm organization that it is ill-equipped to handle, but
which market process economics is helpful for gaining some understanding of.
It is necessary to briefly explicate, first, what is meant by “market process
theories” and, second, what these issues are.
As the name indicates, market process theory focuses on the production of
change and on adjustments to change; unlike mainstream economics it places
entrepreneurs and technological change centerstage at the analysis.  Although
often associated with the Austrian school of economics (e.g., Mises 1949; Hayek
1948; Kirzner 1973; O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1985; Lachmann 1986), the position
taken here is that market process economics is considerably broader in scope,
encompassing also evolutionary (Nelson and Winter 1982), Schumpeterian
(Schumpeter 1934) and post-Marshallian economics (Loasby 1991) and, in fact,
also some contributions with a more formal, neoclassical character (e.g., Fisher
1983) (Boettke and Prychitko 1998: ix; Foss and Christensen 1998).
It is characteristic of all contributions to market process economics that
they fundamentally see economic activities as a matter of producing, utilizing
and disseminating knowledge that is valuable, but also typically dispersed,
tacit, fleeting, and subjective.  The point of view taken and defended here is
that this perspective need to enter the theory of economic organization to a
much greater extent than it has done so far, even in the so-called “knowledge-
based approach to the firm” (e.g., Demsetz 1988; Conner and Prahalad 1996).
2Like markets, firms are vehicles for generating and utilizing local
knowledge, and, like markets, they may offer systems of property rights and
incentives (Holmström and Milgrom 1994) that support this process.  In these
respects, firms are indeed “like markets”, their organizing principles are
identical.  Intuitively, there is in fact not much that markets can do that firms
cannot do, and vice versa (cf. Stinchcombe 1985).  The theory of the firm may too
often have been characterized by an overdrawn dichotomy between the
spontaneous forces of the market and the order-giving of hierarchy (e.g.
Lazonick 1991).  We are not talking about mutually exclusive discrete
governance choices; rather, markets have elements of hierarchy and firms have
elements of the price mechanism.1
To repeat, the argument in this paper is that the theory of economic
organization will benefit from being more conscious about in which ways firms
are “market-like”, and be so in ways that go beyond the traditional debate on
transfer-pricing (Hirshleifer 1956) and are much more influenced by market
process economics, particularly Austrian economics.   It will be beneficial
because better understanding the market-like aspects of firm organization will
lead to a better understanding of a number of real phenomena that are simply
rather hard (if perhaps not ultimately impossible) to conceptualize and explain
through the lens provided by the modern economics of organization.  These
phenomena include the increasing internal disaggregation of large firms
(Zenger and Hesterly 1997), total quality management practices, and the very
phenomenon of leadership.
                                                 
1 On the other hand, it is also incorrrect to state that there firms are merely special market
arrangements, distinguished only by legal matters and by the continuity of association
between input owners.  There are things that firms can do that markets can only do at
prohibitive costs.  More on this in section IV.
3II. The Modern Economics of Organization:
Suppressing Process and Dispersed Knowledge
As Brian Loasby (1976) forcefully points us, economics is a study of
coordination in systems, not of individual decision-making per se.  But systems
may be defined at different levels and the word “coordination” has a number
of meanings.  Moreover, coordination may be thought of as something
happening in time - for example, as an equilibrating process (Kirzner 1973) -
or it may be represented as something accomplished, for example, as an
equilibrium state.
Intuitively, the lay man, the casual reader of the business press or the
MBA student may give several reasons for the importance of coordination and
mechanisms of coordination.  Isn’t the essence of organization is coordinated
response to volatility?  And isn’t almost any real organization full of
coordinative mechanisms, such as standardization of work processes, skills,
norms and products, informal communication, transfer prices, culture, and
explicit supervision, mechanisms that have the purpose of making knowledge,
intentions, and plans dovetail.
A. Coordination - and Incentive Coordination
Given this richness of coordination mechanisms, one is certainly excused for
thinking that the modern economics of organization has chosen an extremely
exclusive, if not to say narrow, research strategy.   The meaning of coordination
in the modern economics of organization is that of mitigating the effects of
incentive-conflicts.2  Thus, incentive-conflicts are ubiquitous and opportunism
                                                 
2 Technically, the modern economics of organization does not really consider what is
usually called “coordination problems”, but rather “prisoners dilemma” games.  In the
former, the pay off space of the game is such that at any equilibrium point, not only does
no player have any incentive to change his behavior (given others’ behavior), but no
player wishes any other player to change as well. In PD games, any player has an
incentive to change his behavior, given other players’ behavior. Because of this, for any
4doesn’t disappear because of, notably, vertical integration (Hart 1995).  Indeed,
from the point of view of the modern economics of organization, the above
coordination mechanisms are not characteristic of any type of economic
organization in particular; they are choice variables that parties to any
transaction may choose as they see fit.  What is essentially different is only the
allocation of property rights. What vertical integration and various other
contractual arrangements may do is simply to change the incentives to engage
in opportunistic behavior.  It is worth spending some time on clarifying this
understanding of coordination.
Many coordination problems may be given a representation in terms of
basic game theory.  In such a setting, economic agents are represented as
choosing game forms and equilibria thereof for regulating their trade.
Efficiency requires, of course, that if agents can find a game form and an
equilibrium thereof that that allows them to do better, they will do so
(Wernerfelt 1997).   For example, we may think of two agents that confront the
following two possible extremely simple games.
                    Game 1                   Game  2
   B         B
   x    y   x    y
x          1, 1              0,0  x           1,1                   0,0
A A
y           0,0              2,2            y           0,0                   3,3
In this simple situation, (Pareto) efficiency requires that agents choose game 2
and play the (3,3) equilibrium.   In such simple situations, problems of
                                                                                                                                    
equilibrium, there is some pure strategy n-tuple that is Pareto superior.   In this paper,
however, I use “coordination problems” to cover both types of interaction problems.
5economic organization are normally taken to be absent, because there are no
incentive conflicts.  However, it is easy to see that this may be unwarranted.
For example, consider game 3:
 Game 3           
      B         
                      x                  y
        x          2, 2               0,0
                  A
     y           0,0              2,2  
Here we have two optimal and identical equilibria; the problem is that there is
nothing whatsoever in classic game theory to tell us which equilibrium will be
chosen (Sugden 1989).  There certainly is a coordination problem, but not one
that is treated in the modern economics of organization.  In order to arrive at
the type of coordination problems that are considered here, we slightly modify
the pay-offs in game two (cf. Wernerfelt 1994: 465),  so that the players now
confront game 4 and 5:
     Game 4        Game 5
           B         B
  x    y   x    y
x          2, 2              0,0  x           2,2                   0,0
A A
y           0,0              4,1            y           0,0                 4-u,1+u
6The problem here is that the Pareto criterion is too weak to select a unique
equilibrium, since both the (2,2) and (4,1) may be equilibria on this criterion.
Now, obviously the (4,1) equilibrium has a higher joint surplus than the (2,2)
equilibrium, and therefore it will be in A’s interest to bribe B to play the y-
strategy.  If u, the bribe, lies between 1 and 2, the equilibrium corresponding to
both A and B playing y will be efficient, and, hence, be chosen.  Thus, efficiency
now implies that the agents agree on (contract on) maximizing and somehow
splitting the joint surplus.   In this situation a market failure occurs when bribes
cannot be sustained in equilibrium.  This may be dependent on the timing of
the game.  For example, if A gives B the bribe before the game begins, B will
not choose the y-strategy, which means that A will decide not to give B any
bribe. Or, A may promise B to pay the bribe after game, but B will realize that
this will not be in A’s interest, and will still choose the x-strategy.  Although the
(2,2) equilibrium is still efficient, it is not joint-surplus maximizing.
These market failures may be remedied through contractual means; for
example, A may agree to pay B a compensation if he does not pay u, or B may
agree to pay A a compensation if he does not choose the y-strategy after
receiving u.  However, such contracts may not always be feasible.   Contracts
fail in the sense that they cannot completely safeguard against the reduction of
surplus/loss of welfare stemming from incentive conflicts.  Such contract
failure may take various forms.
Notably, in a dominant branch of today’s economics of organization,
contracts are seen as incomplete in the sense that some contingencies are left out
for whatever reasons, such as information costs, the limitations of natural
language, the unavoidable emergence of genuine novelties, etc.3  In the context
of the example above, A may confronted with a contingency that is not covered
by the contract, refuse to pay B the bribe, and B may have no recourse.  Or,
while it may be possible for partners to agree on contract terms, these may not
                                                 
3 Although I don’t here discuss the principal/agent approach, the other dominant approach
in the modern economics of organization, the critical comments also applies to this
approach.
7be enforceable by a third party, such as a court.  In the latter case, contract
terms are said to be “non-verifiable”.  Or, the costs of contracting may
outweigh the gains.   In all of these cases, it may not be possible to sustain the
first-best outcome, that is, the one that unambiguously maximizes joint-surplus.
Since complete contingent contracts cannot be written, parties to a contract may
find it necessary to renegotiate their contracts after the contract has been
signed, either because they encounter states of nature about which the contract
is silent or where the contract specifies inefficient terms.  Crucially, it is
assumed, however, that the outcome of the renegotiation process can be
foreseen at the time of drafting contracts and that the process does not involve
costly bargaining (hence, is efficient).  Nevertheless, the very fact of the
possibility of renegotiation may be sufficient to cause inefficient levels of
investment in relation-specific assets.  Thus, incentive conflicts produce a
welfare loss.
The remedy is to choose and efficient allocation of ownership rights, that
is, the rights to control the use of assets in states of nature that are not described
in the contract.  The interest then centers on which pattern of ownership rights
lead to the most efficient outcome; the pattern depending on the characteristics
of the assets (e.g., whether they are complementary), on whose assets are most
important to the joint surplus, and on who is most responsive to incentives,
since ownership by one of the parties will attenuate the incentives of the other
party.   The bottomline is that the efficient ownership arrangements primarily
turns on the trade-off between incentives for the buyer and the seller.
B. Suppressing Process and Dispersed  Knowledge
Although Oliver Williamson’s (1985, 1996)  version of transaction economics is
a partial exception, the modern economics of organization is quintessentially
neoclassical in portraying agents as not only maximizing, but also very well
informed indeed (Hart 1990, 1995).  For example, it is assumed that agent can
foresee the pay-offs from a relation, even if that relation involves a highly
8uncertain innovation and the agents have no knowledge about the innovation
itself (that knowledge is supposed to be produced during the relation) (Tirole
1998).  In fact, in some models there are no asymmetric information or
uncertainty at all.   In models that do feature asymmetric information (e.g.,
about the realization of a stochastic variable and the agent’s effort level in
principal/agent models), everything else but a few variables is assumed to be
common knowledge.
Of course, these modeling strategies are caused by the attempt to keep the
setting (extremely) simple, so that the analyst can sink his teeth in the essence
of the matter, which is simple incentive conflicts, mostly in bilateral settings (as
in the example above).  Moreover, the literature only looks on equilibria and
the “how to get there” problem is not fundamentally an issue.  Because the
knowledge and rationality assumptions are so far reaching, agents are simply
assumed to instantaneously calculate their way to the equilibrium.  The
knowledge issue and the process issue are thus closely connected.
The approach followed by the modern economics of organization has to a
large extent been a successful one.  Both principal/agent, complete contracts
theory and Williamsonian transaction cost economics have been immensely
helpful.  But this should not lead one to forget how narrowly coordination
problems, and therefore problems of economic organization, are portrayed in
this body of thought.   For example, while assuming that agents can think their
way to equilibrium, as it were, may not be an unreasonable approximation for
small-scale settings, it may not be so for larger and more complex interaction
situations. Moreover, only incentive coordination is considered.  In the context
of the examples above, game no. 5 is the ruling paradigm.  But surely, we can
imagine interesting coordination problem that don’t turn on incentive problems
and that may have a bearing on problems of economic organization.  Finally,
all process issues, including learning, are suppressed pressed, so that agents are
assumed to know what type of game they are playing, what gameforms are
available for regulating their trade, which strategies are available, what the
pay-offs are, etc.
9The bottomline is that in the modern economics of organization,
knowledge is not truly dispersed (except for a few variables, everything is
common knowledge),  and problems of uncertainty are essentially side-stepped
(agents are supposed to be able to choose the efficient governance
structure/gameform ex ante).   As a result, the class of permissible coordination
problems is greatly reduced relative to the one that a less restrictive research
strategy may allow for (see further Langlois and Foss 1998).   And as further
result, some phenomena are hard to make sense of when perceived through the
conceptual lens provided by the modern economics of organization.  Thus,
managers provide the right incentives - and that’s it!
That there is a different research strategy and that it may make a
difference for how we perceive of economic organization is the theme of the
following sections.  More specifically,  I shall turn to market process economics
and ask what it has to offer with respect to the analysis of economic
organization.  The reason for doing so has to do with the type of critique that
has been launched in this section; it is a critique that centers on the fact that the
modern economics of organization is equilibrium economics.  And “[m]arket
process theorists of all varieties share in common a profound dissatisfaction
with the way equilibrium economics looks at the world” (Kirzner 1992: 41).
 III. Market Process Economics: Placing Process and
Dispersed Knowledge Centerstage
In the preceding section I criticized the modern economics of organization for
trivializing the dispersion of knowledge and for suppressing process.  But what
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is the basis of this critique?  And how does it matter?  In this section, I attempt
to address the first one of these two questions.
A. What is Market Process Economics?
Although Williamson (1988: 94) observed that “[t]he proposition that process
matters is widely resisted and has attracted little concerted research attention
from economists”, not everybody has resisted this “proposition” and there has
been some “concerted” research effort4, taking place under the banner of
“market process economics” (Boettke and Prychitko 1998).  This line of thought
includes the Austrian school of economics (e.g., Mises 1949; Hayek 1948;
Kirzner 1973; Lachmann 1986), and evolutionary (Nelson and Winter 1982),
Schumpeterian (Schumpeter 1934), and post-Marshallian economics (Loasby
1991), as well as some contributions with a more formal, neoclassical character
(e.g., Fisher 1983).  Fundamentally, these streams attempt to conceptualize and
understand the mechanisms that drive disequilibrium processes of change,
although these mechanisms are conceptualized somewhat differently among
the streams.  For example, evolutionary economics give more attention to forces
of inertia than Austrian economics does.   In the following, I concentrate on
giving a brief signallement of Austrian economics, supplementing with
references to other streams in market process economics when appropriate.
B. Austrian Economics
Arguably, the core concept of Austrian economics is that of “market process”,
that is, active rivalry.  In contrast, there is a tendency in mainstream economics
to conceptualize competition in terms of consistency of maximizing decisions
taken by consumers and producers. Thus, competition is understood in terms
                                                 
4 Historically, the suppression of process in economics is largely a post Second World War
phenomenon (Foss 1994; Machovec 1995).
11
of equilibrium (competitive equilibrium). Moreover, since equilibrium basically
means a state of rest (at least in older conceptualizations), this
conceptualization gives a distinctly static character to the concept of
competition (but see Vickers, 1995).  However, as Friedrich Hayek noted more
than fifty years ago, the economist's equilibrium understanding of competition
differs significantly from lay understanding:
The peculiar nature of the assumptions from which the theory
of competitive equilibrium starts stands out very clearly if we
ask which of the activities that are commonly designated by the
verb “to compete” would still be possible if those conditions
were all satisfied ... I believe that the answer is exactly none.
Advertising, undercutting, and improving (“differentiating”)
the goods and services are all excluded by definition -
“perfect” competition means indeed the absence of all
competitive activities (Hayek, 1948: 96).
Furthermore, Hayek argued that by portraying competition as a tranquil state
rather than as a rivalrous process, what we want from competition, and how
we get it, becomes basically obscured. If competition is indeed best understood
in static terms - as a state characterized by large number of sellers and buyers,
perfect information, consistency between the maximizing decisions of
consumers and producers, with the implied welfare properties - then it is not
necessarily unreasonable to think that this situation can best be achieved by
public intervention (e.g., market socialism), or at least, that public policies can
help society approximate the competitive equilibrium.  But this basically
misconstrues the nature of competition, what we can expect to get out of
competition, and how competition is best promoted.   Briefly, competition
should not be understood as a static state of affairs, but as a rivalrous process.
More specifically, competition is fundamentally a procedure for discovering
... who will serve us well: which grocer or travel agency, which
department store or hotel, which doctor or solicitor, we can
12
expect to provide the most satisfactory solution for whatever
personal problem we may have to face  (Hayek, 1948: 97).
This knowledge is not in any meaningful sense given to a single mind who can
somehow disseminate it across the economic; we rely on competition as the
mechanism for mobilizing and disseminating such dispersed knowledge.  It is
important to appreciate that when Austrians and other market-process theorists
talk about dispersed knowledge, what they have in mind is not “imperfect” or
“asymmetric information” as these are understood in mainstream economics
(e.g. Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983).  Although these are important analytical
categories, there is a further category that is not treated in mainstream
economics, namely sheer (or unknown) ignorance.  Becoming aware of
something (e.g., a profit opportunity) that one had previously overlooked (and
not searched for) is what is meant by discovery.  Kirzner’s argument (which is
discussed more fully below) is then that the competitive market is a superior
setting for generating entrepreneurial discoveries through the exercise of
alertness.  For although the entrepreneur may not search for any profit
opportunity in particular, the lure of pure profit may nevertheless lead him to
continually scan the horizon, as it were (Kirzner 1997: 72).
We rely, in short, on competition because it is an effective procedure for
discovering knowledge that we do not yet know is available or indeed needed at al
(Hayek 1968).  To the extent that this is the social function of competition, it is
to misconstrue competition to portray it as a state in which each market
participant has either deterministically perfect or stochastically perfect
knowledge.  More broadly, it is to misunderstand the character of the economic
problem facing society:
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is
determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circum-
stances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or
integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals
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possess.  The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem
of how to allocate “given” resources - if “given” is taken to mean given
to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by these
“data”. It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources
known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative
importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a
problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in
its totality (Hayek 1945: 78).
What seems to have prompted the emergence of these insights is Hayek’s
involvement during the nineteen-thirties in a debate on the economic feasibility
of socialism, now called “the socialist calculation debate” (Lavoie 1985).
Hayek’s socialist opponents here either maintained that all relevant knowledge
could in fact be centralized, or, if it could not, the problem could be solved by
telling socialist managers to obey simple price-setting rules that would lead to
an optimal allocation of resources.
Against this, Hayek argued that the market socialists basically overlooked
1) problems of incentive compatibility, 2) tacit local knowledge (which couldn’t
be centralized) and 3) the need for rapid adaptation to unexpected
contingencies/novelties (which made centralization inefficient).  With respect
to the last point, Hayek observed that
[i]f we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of
rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and
place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to
the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know
directly of the relevant changes and of the resources immediately
available to meet them. We cannot expect that this problem will be
solved by first communicating all this knowledge to a central board
which, after integrating all knowledge, issues its orders (Hayek 1945:
83-84).
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Hayek’s point, of course, is that a “central board” is not at all necessary: a market
system, meaning a system with alienable property rights, promotes a tendency
towards allocating property rights to those who can make best use of them and
competition ensures that best use is indeed made of these rights.
However, it has been left to Israel Kirzner (1973, 1992) in particular to
elaborate the details of the Austrian view of the market process. In doing this,
he has put primary emphasis on the entrepreneur.  As Kirzner (1973: 14)
argues,  “..our confidence in the market's ability to learn and to harness the
continuous flow of information to generate the market process depends
crucially on our belief in the benign presence of the entrepreneurial element”.
The foundation of this claim lies in Kirzner’s distinction between “Robbinsian
maximizing” and “entrepreneurial alertness”. The first behavioral category
conforms to the standard picture of economic man as basically applying given
means to best satisfy given but conflicting ends in a fundamentally mechanical
way (Robbins 1934). Since everything is given, action becomes purely a matter
of calculation.  Kirzner points out that within this conceptualization of
behavior, the discovery of new means, of new ends, and the setting up of new
means-ends structures simply cannot be rationalized.
As a result, the dynamic market process cannot be understood in terms of
the passive mode of behavior of Robbinsian maximizing; we need another
behavioral quality, the quality of entrepreneurial alertness to hitherto
unexploited profit opportunities. This alertness factor ranges from the
discovery of a ten dollar bill on the street to the discovery of a need for a new
potentially extremely profitable drug. Thus, entrepreneurs are discoverers; they
discover new resource-uses, new products, new markets, new possibilities for
arbitrage, in short, new possibilities for profitable trade.
Combining his notion of entrepreneurial behavior with Hayek’s notion of
the market as a dynamic process, Kirzner paints a broad picture of the market
process as a continual process of entrepreneurial discovery of hitherto
unnoticed opportunities for pure profit. The profits earned in this process are
15
discovered profits - profits that are earned because of the discovery, creation
and exploitation of profit opportunities that would not be grasped in the absence of
entrepreneurial activity.  Thus, the entrepreneurial function is beneficial because
it alleviates the problem introduced by the division of knowledge.  It is not
only that entrepreneurial activity reduces our lack of knowledge about which
products, processes, new organizational forms, etc. are needed; it is more
fundamentally that entrepreneurial activity alleviates our ignorance about what
we don’t know.
C. The Firm, Austrian Economics, and the Modern Economics of
Organization
Let me begin by tackling a seeming paradox.  Market process economics is
normally taken to be first and foremost a theory of the market process. In
contrast, market process economics is not seen as containing a theory of the
firm, and one seeks in vain for any details about firm organization in at least
the corpus of Austrian literature (although there is more on the firm in such
works as Nelson and Winter 1982 and Loasby 1991).5  However, the claims
presented and defended here are 1) that market process economics represents a
powerful critique of the modern economics of organization, and 2) that it
contains a number of distinct insights in economic organization.  Thus, I shall
argue that it is in fact possible and fruitful to apply ideas developed in the
context of furthering the theory of markets to the theory of the firm.
Let us begin by considering point 1); the other point will be treated in the
next section.  On the overall level, the Austrian challenge consists in posing the
question,  How does order arise in an economy in which there is an extensive
division of knowledge, and in which novelties can be expected to emerge - and
where we cannot rely on such constructs as the Walrasian auctioneer, common
knowledge assumptions or “rational expectations” to do the job?   Applied to
                                                 
5 For discussions of the reasons for this neglect, see Foss (1994, 1997).
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firms, the radical subjectivist challenge may be rephrased thus:  How is rational
firm organization possible when we cannot simply assume from the outset that
· all contracting action can be compressed into one initial grand contract, as in the
principal/agent paradigm - because of the occurrence of novelties;
· principals know all the possible actions that are open to agents  - because of the
division of knowledge;
· agents, for example, division managers in a firm, hold the same cognitive
constructs - because of different subjective perceptions of reality;
· decision rights are efficiently assigned - because entrepreneurial activity may
discover better assignments;
· agents can perform dynamic programming and perfectly foresee their pay-offs
(or at least the distribution thereof) (Kreps 1996) - because of the occurrence of
novelties;
· etc.,
but must think of these as either non-permissible abstractions (e.g., the complete
contracting assumption) or as explananda rather than data (the efficient assignment
of decision rights).
In short, the Austrian challenge consists in portraying coordination problems
as a good deal more complicated and messy than they are portrayed in the modern
economics of organization.  In the latter, there has been a clear tendency to focus on
situations where everything is coordinated, but for a single variable or relation.
For example, in the canonic principal-agent set-up, the principal knows the range
of courses that are open to the agent, his preferences and the probabilities
distribution of the stochastic variable that impinges on the agent’s output.  His only
problem is that he cannot observe the agent’s effort.  However, he is able to design
a second-best incentive scheme (at no contracting cost).  In this set-up, and in
virtually all other organizational economics models, any process of  entrepreneurial
17
discovery is completely suppressed by assumption.  Knowledge is not truly
dispersed.
IV.  Organizing Discovery Processes:
A Market Process Perspective on Firms
In this section, I briefly explore the constructive implications for the theory of the
firm of adopting a market process view.
A. Dispersed Knowledge and Economic Organization: General
In contrast to markets, firms are planned by identifiable historical individuals with
the purpose of earning a profit and they normally operate under a designed
framework, such as a mission statement, a formal organization structure, etc.6
They are set in motion, as it were, by conscious intention rather than by
spontaneous forces.  Nevertheless, firms of even a moderate size confronts a
Hayekian knowledge problem, which is bound to produce outcomes that are, at
least to some extent, unanticipated and unintended to (top-)management.   If
management is unable to centralize all dispersed and tacit knowledge possessed by
the employees, an implication will be that they will in general have a more fine-
grained understanding of their environments than their bosses.  In addition, they
are likely to also know more about the realizations of their action sets (Minkler
1993). As Sautet (1998) points out, management confronts a “double Hayekian
knowledge problem”: it is not just that it doesn’t know what it doesn’t know in the
market; it is also the case that it doesn’t know what it doesn’t know about the firm’s
employees.
                                                 
6  Indeed, Vanberg (1994) talks in this connection of the firm’s “constitution”.
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These are implications of the division of knowledge that are not treated in the
modern economic of organization, for the obvious reason that they mean the
introduction of phenomena that are hard to handle in formal terms, notably
unexpected events (the agent may choose an action that the principal does not
know), learning (the agent may expand his action set in ways that are not foreseen
or even understood by the principal) and diverging “theories” (the principal and
the agent may have different views of relevant causal relations).
The practical implication is that because an employee has finer and wider
knowledge of the realization of his action set than his boss, he may arrive at
different conclusions as to how certain events that are relevant to the firm should
be handled and what their consequences may be.   There is, therefore, a powerful
argument that the agent should possess extensive decision rights so that he is
actually enabled to exercise his entrepreneurial alertness.  Of course, this insight
lies behind the contemporary emphasis on quasi-autonomous teams (Semler 1989;
Meyer 1994).
B.  Planning
Taken to their logical extremes, both popular management thinking on teams and
an extreme emphasis on local knowledge may seem to lead to a denial of the need
for firms, for they both seem to be simply contractual institutions for the efficient
exploitation of dispersed knowledge.  There is no real difference between them, a
view often associated with the so-called “nexus of contracts view” in the
contemporary theory of the firm (Cheung 1983).
It is true that it is indeed hard to find a sharp dividing line between firms and
markets, in principle as well as in practice.  However, there are nevertheless things
that real-life firms can do that real-life markets seldom are capable of, and vice
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versa.  For example, real-life firms can combine strong decentralization with
planning and hierarchy (as the case of Asea-Brown-Boveri confirms).  The fact that
we cannot have detailed top-down planning that mobilizes and incorporates all
dispersed and tacit firm does not mean that we cannot have some sort of planning.
Most large-scale firms regularly do carry out strategic planning exercises, and
continue to do so, which suggests (if not proves) that such exercises may have some
sort of value.  That value may exactly be that although nobody believes that all
dispersed and tacit knowledge can be mobilized, a regular strategic planning
exercise does indeed make clearer to management what sort of knowledge is
present in the organization and which learning processes are going on locally (say,
in a foreign subsidiary).  This knowledge may be used for the purpose of
transferring superior practices to other parts of the organization.7  Thus, it is
suggested here that such a directed planning exercise is something that markets
cannot do, but firms can.
C. Leadership and Management
Planning, however, is sometimes no more than defining and having a policy to
emergent events.  In such cases, “leadership” may be a better word.  In an Austrian
world, adapting to emergent events is a key problem and while markets have
sometimes been argued to accomplish such adaptation in a superior way (relative
to central planning) (Hayek 1945), we should recognize that firms may sometimes
beat the market here (cf. also Kreps 1990).  However, first we have to tackle the
problem of how one can one speak of a “policy to emergent events”; isn’t this a
contradiction in terms, for the simple reason that what is unanticipated cannot be
planned for?
As the Austrian economists, O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1985) point out, this is not
necessarily the case.   Referring to  the work of philosopher-sociologist, Alfred
                                                 
7 In fact, there is a strong argument that it is precisely the ability to transfer at low cost successful
practices that gives multinational firms a competitive edge not only over domestic firms but
also over the market (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989).
20
Schütz, they point out that events have “typical” and “unique” features (Langlois
1986: 182).  Typification is an aspect of the way in which agents (including firms)
perceive their environment. Typical features are those elements of the environment
that are stable, while the unique features are non-repeatable and idiosyncratic.
While we can often clearly foresee typical features, we often have to let time pass
before we can fill in the unique features.  It is the mix of typicality and uniqueness
in most actual events that makes it possible, after all, to have a “policy to emergent
events”.
However, the mix of typical and unique features in actual (emergent) events
also means that coordination problems are typically hierarchical. As Calvert (1992:
12) points out, the ongoing interactions of real life, for example, inside large firms,
are not simple repeated games.  There is unlikely to be an exact correspondence
between players, strategies and outcomes in various “repetitions” of “the game”.
Instead, there is a Hayekian division of knowledge, implying that players are likely
to have incomplete information about other players, previous plays, etc.  In this
situation, there is likely to be multiple equilibria, but, unfortunately, behavior that
is appropriate for play in one equilibrium may be inappropriate for another
equilibrium; equilibrium strategies are not interchangeable. The problem of
selecting the right equilibrium is clearly a higher-order coordination problem.
Thus, one may think of the act of choosing which coordination game to play,
of making sense out of new events (and communicating this), etc. as more
fundamental than the problem of inducing agents to make specific actions within
an already well-understood decision situation.    The higher in the hierarchy a
coordination problem is placed, the more abstract the solutions(s) are likely to be.
we may think management in an Austrian perspective as consisting of solving (or
helping to solve) “lower-level” coordination problems, while planning (or
leadership) is the higher-level activity of selecting “precedents” or “focal points”
that may assist in management as well as in judgment exercised on the shop floor.
Relative to the market, the firm may have an advantage, because it can use the
mechanisms of planning and leadership to reduce the severity of coordination
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problems: whereas in market interactions, agents may have to home in on a
coordinated state through trial and error, fiat may sometimes be a low cost
mechanism for finding the right equilibrium.8
D. The Boundaries of the Firm
Seemingly, this idea runs counter to the main message of the socialist
calculation debate that decentralized market processes are more likely to find
efficient solutions than centralized schemes are capable of.   But this is not
necessarily so.  It is more correct to say that the presence of dispersed
knowledge is a constraint on the efficiency of planning.  Planning isn’t always
inefficient, but it has its limits.
Applied to firms, this means that the dispersion of knowledge acts as a
constraint on the size and the boundaries of the firm, although it is almost
completely neglected in contemporary theorizing on the firm.   One reason why
the dispersion of knowledge matters is that dispersed knowledge means
different knowledge, and (very) different knowledge is not easily managed in
the same organization, as Richardson (1972) pointed out more than twenty-five
years ago.  While a mainstream perspective cannot easily handle this insight,9 it
goes naturally with an Austrian subjectivist perspective.
On the other hand, firms can alleviate the knowledge problems they face
by means of organizational innovations.  As I discuss in the next sub-section,
the M-form was one such innovation.  One, more contemporary, organizational
innovation that help to reduce firms’ knowledge problems may be the
increasing use that large corporations are making of internal disaggregation,
that is, making the corporation consist to a larger extent of smaller, more
autonomous units that are treated more like external subcontractors.  While this
                                                 
8  For a transaction cost approach to this, see Kirsten Foss (1998).
9 For example, Hart (1995) argues that strongly complementary assets should always be
managed in the same organization  - a proposition that clearly may not hold if the assets
in question are strongly “dissimilar” in Richardson’s (1972) terminology.
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organizational innovation clearly has the effect of mimicking market (high-
powered) incentives, it has also has more knowledge-related beneficial effects.
It is simply easier to observe and reward agents in a small-scale setting,
because knowledge problems are less severe.  Moreover, the increasing use of
the price mechanism that internal disaggregation implies is not only a matter of
exploiting the high-powered incentives of this mechanism, but also of making
use of a mechanism than in large scale systems may be a more efficient
mechanism for conveying knowledge that planning and direction.
E. The Diversified Firm
To repeat, the modern economics of organization almost exclusively focuses on
what I have called “incentive coordination”.  This also goes for the analysis of
internal organization such as what has become known as the “M-form”.  Here,
analysis is cast almost entirely in terms of reducing incentive conflicts, that is,
choosing the right profit and cost centers, and constraining rent-seeking efforts
on the part of hierarchical subordinates (Williamson 1985; Milgrom 1988).
However, another, Austrian-style, interpretation is possible (Foss 1997; Sautet
1998).
In an Austrian story the advantages of the M-form may have more to do
with the knowledge-related advantages of increasing the internal division of
labour.   It is not only that some organizational arrangements may lead to a
better use of dispersed knowledge than others. It is also that the division of
labour promotes the growth of knowledge (Loasby 1994), and some divisions
of labour can only be achieved by certain organizational arrangements.  For
example, the M-form frees top-management of daily operational control, so that
they become more able to specialize in the sort of overall, strategic judgment
that both Frank Knight (1921) and Edith Penrose (1959) in different ways
highlighted in their theories of the firm.  In other words, the M-form may
promote a growth of knowledge that simply couldn’t take place under other
organizational arrangements, such as the U-form. Organizational structures
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thus both constrain and enable processes of  entrepreneurial discovery.  In
doing this they may lead to the creation of different real options.
F. Real Options and Economic Organization
The notion from market process economics that markets are “discovery
procedures” means that they mobilize a beneficial entrepreneurial discovery
process.   And one, broadly Schumpeterian, interpretation of this is that
markets are successful arenas for social experimentation with products,
processes, types of organization, etc. (Rosenberg 1994).  Social experimentation,
in turn, is facilitated by flexibility: it is because of the flexibility afforded by
freedom of contract and alienable property rights that inherently uncertain
commercial experiments can be (comparatively) quickly and efficiently set up
and tested.
However, both markets and firms may be seen as embodiments of
flexibility and therefore possible arenas for commercial experimentation.  In
fact, as Coase (1937) stressed, and as modern writers have argued in more
detail (Loasby 1994; Langlois and Robertson 1995; Williamson 1996; Foss 1996;
Kirsten Foss 1998), one of the primary advantages of an entity consisting of
incomplete contracts and authority relations is precisely the superior flexibility
that this arrangement may confer.  Here is a problem, for if both firms and
markets (and intermediate forms) are seen as instruments of adaptation and
flexibility, it is hard to use these notions to discriminate between them.
However, one possible way of conceptualizing the market process theory
notion that firms and markets may embody flexibility is to say that they both
have option value in an uncertain world,  in the sense of, for example, Dixit and
Pindyck (1994).  In other words, firms and markets may (also) be seen as
portfolios of real options.  For example, as Ron Sanchez (1993) points out, firms
may be flexible in terms of, for example, which products they wish to produce,
when they will produce (and develop and market) these products, and how the
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production (and sale and marketing and development) of the products should
be organized.  Such options are to a large extent the result of the imagination of
the management team. For example, what Penrose (1959) calls the firm’s
“productive opportunity set” - which encompasses all of the opportunities that
the firm’s management can see and can (but doesn’t have to) take advantage of
- clearly constitutes a set of real (product) options.  Therefore, real options are
products of entrepreneurial imagination, but they can, in principle, be valued
using the same tools that have been developed in the context of financial
options.  A rational options strategy - that is, a set of decisions relating to
which options to invest in -  does indeed require a vision of possible futures, an
idea of “the imagined deemed possible” (Shackle 1972).
The interesting thing about real options theory in the present context is
that it provides one possible bridge between market process economics and
economic organization.  Here, a possible starting point is supplied by Loasby’s
(1994) suggestion that we should look upon ongoing (and well-developed)
markets as embodying options for future contracts, an idea that clearly
dovetails with the Austrian emphasis on the flexibility of the market (Hayek
1945, 1946).  Translated into the terminology used here, an ongoing, well-
developed market provide options to wait and options to abandon to firms: they
allow firms to defer the acquisition of inputs and make it contingent on an
actual, future need, and they allow firms to get rid of unconsumed inputs
(Sanchez 1993: 272).  Likewise, participating in networks and other sorts of
interfirm arrangements may increase the number of real options available to
firms, for example, by providing better access to other firms’ capabilities (thus
allowing the firm to extend its technological capabilities and generate more
product options), to “thin” input markets, and to the collective capabilities of
the network.  Thus, these institutions constitute part of the enabling context of
entrepreneurship: they are largely makes “the imagined” possible.
The other side of the coin is, of course, that internalization forfeits the
option to wait to acquire inputs; it cuts off the firm from a contingent deferral
25
of the commitment to incur the cost of inputs.  From this perspective alone,
firms should internalize only a few inputs that are exceptionally difficult to
obtain through markets or networks and are capable of generating superior
options values for the firm (Sanchez 1993).  This is in line with standard
organizational economics (e.g., Williamson 1996) in which vertical integration
is also seen as an option of last resort.
On the other hand, we cannot condemn vertical integration en bloc for it
may have other advantages that only become clear in an options perspective.
For example, vertical integration may help firms reduce costs of production.
But reducing costs of production means that experimenting in the market place
with different product varieties becomes less expensive; that is, vertical
integration may actually help testing various product options.10  Similarly,
diversification can rationalized in terms of its lowering costs of production
because of economies of scope and therefore also making experimentation with
new products relatively cheaper.
These examples show two things.  First, there is intertemporal
complementarity - a favorite Austrian theme (Lachmann 1986) - between
options and decisions: a decision to integrate influences positively a later
decision to experiment with products in the market place, and vice versa.  This
implies that we can also in this way find a room for learning in the theory of the
firm, since learning (from experimenting) is dependent on economic
organization.
Second, the choice between alternative types of economic organization -
that is, whether to integrate or not - will depend on an estimate of the value of
experimenting with products in the market place, that is, on the estimated
value of learning.  However, as Lachmann points out, “the future is
unknowable, though not unimaginable. Future knowledge cannot be had now, but
                                                 
10  Relatedly, setting up a controlled experiment may be more difficult across boundaries of
firms and in particular if interdependencies exists between many different firms (Kirsten
Foss 1998).  Thus, vertical integration may be undertaken in order to economize with the costs
of carrying out experimental activity.
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it can cast its shadow ahead. In each mind, however, the shadow assumes a
different shape, hence the divergence of expectations” (Lachmann, 1976: 59).
Therefore, what is for the firm the efficient proportion between market and
hierarchy depends on a vision of possible futures, including a vision of which
products the firm can produce in the future, which inputs are necessary for
producing these products, and an estimate of whether input markets can be
expected to be well-behaved or not (Sanchez 1993: 276).  Such a vision may
very well turn out to be wrong.  Thus, we can find a room for error and indeed
for an ongoing market process in our story.  The theory of the firm and market
process economics join hands in this way, too.
V. Conclusion
A common charge against market process economics is that it is barren and
destructive rather than constructive.  Market process theorists spend their
criticizing the mainstream but does not contribute much themselves.  The
message of this paper is that although this view may historically have some
truth to it (Foss 1994b: chapter 10), it need not be so: market process theories
contain a number of useful ideas that can further the understanding of
economic organization, and do so in ways that are rather different from those
of the modern economics of organization.
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